A fair and abuse-free contract signing protocol from Boneh-Boyen signature by Heidarvand, Somayed & Villar Santos, Jorge Luis
A Fair and Abuse-Free Contract Signing
Protocol from Boneh-Boyen Signature
Somayeh Heidarvand and Jorge L. Villar
Universitat Polite`cnica de Catalunya, Spain
{somayeh,jvillar}@ma4.upc.edu
Abstract. A fair contract signing protocol is used to enable two mis-
trusted parties to exchange two signatures on a given contract, in such
a way that either both of them get the other party’s signature, or none
of them gets anything. A new signature scheme is presented, which is a
variant of Boneh and Boyen’s scheme, and building on it, we propose a
new signature fair exchange protocol for which all the properties of be-
ing optimistic, setup-free and abuse-free can be proved without random
oracles, and it is more eﬃcient than the known schemes with comparable
properties.
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1 Introduction
Due to the developing of the Internet and other computer networks in all aspects
of life, electronic commerce has introduced the new need of being able to sign
contracts remotely, especially when two parties A and B do not trust each other.
A contract signing protocol is called fair if both parties get the desired signatures
or none of them gets anything, even in the case they try to cheat each other.
In traditional paper-based contract signing, the two parties sign a contract at
the same place and time, so fairness can be ‘physically’ enforced. However, in
online contract signing once one party (say B) gets the signature from the other
party (say A), nobody can prevent him from immediately leaving the protocol
without committing himself to the contract. Fairness in contract signing can
be considered in the more general context of fair exchange of signatures, that
is closely related to some other concepts like certiﬁed e-mail systems and non-
repudiation protocols.
Many protocols for fair exchange of signatures have been proposed in the
literature. The early works on this subject focused on gradual release of two sig-
natures from two parties [17] and [10], but the resulting protocols are very ineﬃ-
cient and they only provide a weak notion of fairness. Hence, most fair exchange
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protocols make use of a trusted third party or arbitrator T . Straightforward yet
ineﬃcient protocols can be deﬁned assuming T is available online [4,12]. How-
ever, the most interesting protocols are optimistic [1,3], that is, T is not invoked
in a normal protocol execution but only when one party has to complain against
the other. In optimistic fair exchange (OFE) protocols the messages exchanged
by the parties are commitments to the signatures, which can be opened by the
trusted party in case of conﬂict. For instance, veriﬁable escrows are used in [1],
while veriﬁable encryptions are used in [3].
Although some existing OFE protocols use many rounds, here we will restrict
ourselves to three-move protocols, in which after setting up the system a signer
A sends a commitment of her signature to B, then after some veriﬁcations B
sends his signature to A, and ﬁnally A opens the committed signature to B.
If A does not fulﬁl the third move, then B can ask T for the opening of the
committed signature. Notice that in this case, B must provide some information
to T so that he can extract and send B’s signature to A, thus guaranteing the
protocol fairness.
As well as fairness and optimism, some other desirable properties for a con-
tract signing protocol have been considered in the literature. Nevertheless, abuse-
freeness [16] seems to be the most important and diﬃcult property among them.
In some applications, it is very important to preserve the signers’ privacy until
the very end of the protocol. Therefore the following attack must be considered:
Getting A’s commitment to her signature, B could leave the protocol and prove
to an external party C that A has committed to a signature on the contract, thus
showing A’s intention to sign it. Abuse-free optimistic contract signing protocols
prevent this and other similar attacks. The main goal in these systems is making
the transcript of an unﬁnished protocol instance completely simulatable by the
malicious party alone, and thus non-convincing for an external party. The con-
cept of abuse-freeness is in a very close relation to designated verifier signature
schemes. Actually some fair exchange protocols make use of designated veriﬁer
signatures, which can be turned into universally veriﬁable by both the signer
and T .
Timeliness is a property of an exchange protocol that informally assures that
any party will end the protocol execution in a ﬁnite bounded time. To address
that problem a synchronous network model, which assumes the existence of a
network global time, is considered. An interesting discussion about the diﬀerent
approaches to the concept of timeliness can be found in [30], and some results
about optimistic contract signing protocols in both the synchronous and asyn-
chronous network models are presented in [29].
Another desirable property of an OFE is setup-freeness, which means that no
interaction between the signers and the trusted party is required, either during
setup or during the normal protocol execution. This property allows the signers
to freely designate the trusted party in a system in which more than one are
available. Moreover, non setup-free protocols require T to maintain some setup
information that grows with the number of potential signers.
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1.1 Our Contribution
Our contribution is twofold. On the one hand, we propose a new signature
scheme, which is a variant of Boneh-Boyen signature scheme [5], and we show it
is strong existentially unforgeable under chosen message attacks in the standard
model, under the strong Diﬃe-Hellman assumption. We also build a convertible
signature scheme from it, which we call a partial signature scheme. The partial
signatures derived from it can be veriﬁed or converted into universally veriﬁable
signatures either by the signer or by T . Actually, the conversion is very eﬃcient
(compared to other schemes using veriﬁable encryption) since it involves just
one exponentiation, and the partial signatures can be veriﬁed in zero-knowledge
by either the signer or T by means of the eﬃcient concurrent proof of equality
of two discrete logarithms [9,10] (described in Section 3.2).
On the other hand, based on the new signature schemes we propose a new
contract signing protocol, which is optimistic, setup-free and abuse-free in the
certiﬁed key model (i.e., every party registers his public keys by proving the
knowledge of the corresponding secret key). Indeed it is the veriﬁable knowledge
of the secret key by B what makes B unable to convince a third party about the
information he collects during an unﬁnished exchange protocol. All the above
properties of our scheme hold in the standard model. To the best of our knowl-
edge, our proposal is the most eﬃcient abuse-free optimistic contract signing
protocol in the standard model.
The eﬃciency of the new contract signing scheme is comparable to the ex-
isting abuse-free protocols in the random oracle model [16,31]. The proposed
scheme works in only ﬁve rounds (three rounds correspond to the three-move
architecture of the exchange protocol, and the two extra rounds come from the
zero-knowledge proof). The communication complexity of our protocol is very
small compared to the RSA based schemes: Typically the total length of a partial
signature in our scheme is about 480 bits. The ordinary signatures sent by both
signers in the last rounds of our protocol have the same length as the partial
signature. However, in the last round, the signer can just send one group element
(160 bits) instead of a whole signature, which saves 320 bits.
1.2 Related Work
Some practical fair exchange protocols have been recently introduced, but only
a few of them address the abuse-free property. In 2001 an eﬃcient protocol is
proposed in [25], but abuse-freeness is not addressed. Some protocols for contract
signing based on RSA are proposed in [27,31]. However the scheme in [27] is
broken and repaired in [14], where it is proved to be secure in the random oracle
model. The idea of these two papers is splitting the secret exponent d into two
secrets d1 and d2 such that d = d1 + d2, and sending d2 to T . Then the ﬁrst
signer A gives a partial signature on the contract with the secret key d1, along
with a 5-round zero-knowledge proof of its validity (note that the related ‘public’
exponents e1 and e2 are kept secret here). Abuse-freeness is considered in [31]
but only in an informal way. Actually, abuse-freeness could hold in the random
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oracle model, and under some computational assumption (an adversary capable
to solve the DDH problem can easily break the abuse-freeness, in a single instance
of the protocol). The protocol in [14] is not setup-free since the ﬁrst signer must
send d2 to the trusted party before running an instance of the protocol.
In 2006, Lu et al. [24] proposed the ﬁrst veriﬁably encrypted signature scheme,
provably secure in the standard model. The scheme is based on Waters’ signature
scheme [32], and it works in the certiﬁed key model. In 2008 another proposal [19]
is introduced, which works in the more general chosen key model, which means
the adversary can choose its public key arbitrarily without requiring it to prove
the knowledge of the corresponding secret key. Although both schemes are quite
eﬃcient, they do not address the abuse-free property. In a later work [20], the
same authors deﬁne the notion of signer-ambiguity, which is tightly related to
abuse-freeness, and they propose a new setup-free optimistic fair exchange proto-
col that achieves signer-ambiguity. However, the resulting scheme is far from be-
ing practical due to the computational cost of the pairing-based non-interactive
zero-knowledge proofs by Groth and Sahai [18].
A more general notion of contract signing protocols in the certiﬁed key model
was proposed in [13], where a generic construction in a multi-user setting based
on one-way functions is provided. However, in this paper we focus on the most
common scenario of two-party schemes, but we attach the identities of both
signers and T to the contract in order to prevent trivial attacks in the multi-
user setting.
1.3 Road Map
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We ﬁrst recall the formal deﬁnition
of a fair exchange protocol in Section 2. In Section 3 the basic tools on which
our scheme is based are presented. Section 4 introduces the two new signature
schemes based on Boneh-Boyen’s one. Section 5 gives the description and the
security analysis of the proposed contract signing protocol. We conclude the
paper with some considerations about eﬃciency.
2 Model and Deﬁnitions
In this section we restrict the deﬁnition of an optimistic contract signing protocol
to the three-move architecture [14] described in the introduction, which is enough
for our purposes. For a more general deﬁnition, see [16,31].
A contract signing protocol is a protocol in which two parties A and B ex-
change two signatures σA, σB on a contract M . We assume in all the paper
that A starts the protocol execution. The signatures exchanged, called ordinary
signatures, are assumed to be existentially unforgeable1. Ordinary signatures cor-
respond to a signature scheme, described with the usual subprotocols KeyGen,
Sign and Ver, respectively denoting key generation, signing and veriﬁcation.
1 There is no need to consider the strong unforgeability for the selected signature
scheme. Actually once a signer signs a contract, it does not matter if another signa-
ture for the same contract be forged under the public key of the signer.
A Fair and Abuse-Free Contract Signing Protocol 129
An auxiliary subprotocol called a partial signature scheme is needed in the
deﬁnition of the three-move protocol. It is functionally described as follows:
– PKeyGen is the key generation for the signer A, the recipient B and the
trusted party T .
– PSign. A partial signature on a message m is computed by A. The public
key of T is used as an input.
– PVer is an interactive veriﬁcation protocol2 for a partial signature ρA be-
tween A and B, which is run immediately after PSign.
– Conv is a protocol run by T on a partial signature ρA to extract the corre-
sponding ordinary signature σA.
We assume that T can noninteractively verify the validity of a partial signa-
ture ρA. A three-move optimistic contract signing protocol can be described by
the following subprotocols:
– Setup. On a common input of some system parameters, during this protocol
every signer produces, registers and publishes his signing and veriﬁcation
keys; and T produces, registers and publishes his resolving key, according to
KeyGen and PKeyGen.
– Exch. In a ﬁrst move A runs PSig on a contract M (known to both A and
B) and sends the resulting partial signature ρA to B. Then A and B execute
PVer so that B can check the validity of ρA. In a second move, B runs Sig
to obtain a signature σB on M , and sends it back to A. In the third move,
after A veriﬁes σB with Ver, she sends a signature σA on M to B (computed
directly with Sig or from the output of Conv on the input of ρA).
– Res. A protocol run by B and T , started by B when in the last move of
Exch, B receives an invalid σA or nothing (i.e., A left the protocol). If T
accepts (after verifying some information provided by B, which could include
ρA and a partial signature ρB on M) then he extracts σA and σB from the
information received, and sends σA to B and σB to A.
Notice that we do not allow A to raise any complain to T . Although in a
more general deﬁnition that possibility exists, in a three-move protocol either A
receives nothing (and hence B does not come up with a valid signature), or A
receives B’s signature, either from B or from T .
2.1 Security Notions
We brieﬂy review the security deﬁnitions in [14,13] except for abuse-freeness,
which is not addressed there. We follow the commonly accepted deﬁnition of
abuse-freeness in [16], but adapted to the case of three-move protocols.
A secure abuse-free optimistic contract signing protocol has to fulﬁl the fol-
lowing security requirements:
2 PVer is deﬁned as an interactive protocol to allow the use of interactive proof
systems, like zero-knowledge proofs.
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– Correctness. If all the parties behave honestly (and the network works prop-
erly) then at the end of Exch every signer gets a valid signature on the
contract M under the public key of the other signer.
– Ambiguity. Any resolved signature (i.e., resulting from Res) is indistinguish-
able from a signature generated with Sig.
– Security Against A. A must not be able to produce a partial signature ρA
in such a way that convinces B about its correctness, but it cannot be
transformed into a valid signature by T during a Res subprotocol execution.
– Security Against B. B must not be able to output an ordinary signature σA
on M , even after executing PSig, PVer and Res for some partial signatures
and messages adaptively chosen by B, with the only restriction that Res is
not executed on any partial signature on M .
– Security against T . Here we assume that T is an honest but curious adversary.
Informally, T is prevented from performing any meaningful computation
other than Res. More precisely, T must not be able to forge a valid ordinary
signature σA on M , even after eavesdropping at some executions of Exch
on contracts diﬀerent from M .
– Abuse-freeness. B does not obtain publicly veriﬁable information about (hon-
est) A signing the contract until B is also bound by the contract. Observe
that A cannot abuse B in a three-move contract signing protocol, since
the only information A can receive from an honest B is his ordinary sig-
nature (and this happens only when A herself is bound to the contract).
Abuse-freeness is equivalent to show the impossibility for an external party
to publicly verify a partial signature issued by A (providing him with the
information learned by B in the PVer execution).
Observe that assuming the unforgeability of the ordinary signatures, the above
deﬁnitions of security against A and B imply fairness. Indeed, if ﬁnally A learns
a valid signature σB , it must come from B (in the second move) or from T (as a
result of Res, which means that B also receives σA). But the ﬁrst case means
that B receives a valid ρA, which allows B to successfully run Res with T and
get σA. Conversely, if B gets σA, it must come from A (in the third move, so A
also have σB) or from T (so A also received σB). Otherwise, B forged σA perhaps
from ρA, which is impossible due to the deﬁnition of security against B.
To address the timeliness property (i.e., the execution of a protocol instance
will be terminated by any party in ﬁnite bounded time) we assume that the
communication of honest parties with T is reliable enough, so that an adversary
can only introduce some delay in the delivery of messages (say up to certain
limit Δ), but it is not allowed to delete or replace such messages. This allows us
to use the deadline technique suggested by Micali in [26]. We also assume that
the parties can reliably refer to T ’s local time. Actually, in any optimistic fair
exchange protocol some extra assumption about the availability of the trusted
party must be made, since T not being available within a reasonable time implies
breaking one of the timeliness or fairness properties.
An optimistic fair exchange protocol is setup-free if Setup can be run with
no interaction between T and the signers, with common input of some trustily
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generated system parameters. Therefore, setup-freeness is basically depends on
the properties of the PKeyGen protocol.
3 Basic Tools
3.1 Pairing Systems
Assume that G1 = 〈g1〉, G2 = 〈g2〉 and GT are (multiplicative) groups of prime
order p that have a non-degenerate eﬃciently computable bilinear map e : G1×
G2 → GT such that
– (Bilinear) For all (u, v) ∈ G1 ×G2, for all a, b ∈ Z, e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab.
– (Non-degenerate) gT = e(g1, g2) = 1, so gT is a generator of GT .
– (Eﬃcient) e and the group operations in G1, G2 and GT can be eﬃciently
computed.
It is often assumed that G1 = G2 but some known pairing systems allows for
G1 = G2 and give a more compact representation of elements in G1, which
is interesting for eﬃciency reasons [15]. Also an eﬃciently computable isomor-
phism ψ : G2 → G1 could exist in some pairing systems. Notice that we do
not require ψ(g2) = g1 as many papers do. This means that we use random-
ized generators g1 and g2. We say that the pairing system parameters are
psys = (p,G1, G2, GT , g1, g2, e, ψ, gT ), and they are hereafter assumed to be
known by all the parties in a pairing based cryptographic protocol. It is widely
believed that the following two assumptions hold in some pairing systems:
Assumption 1 (Strong Diﬃe-Hellman (q-SDH)). [6] Every probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm A has a negligible success probability in solving the
following problem: Given a pairing system psys and the tuple (gx1 , g
x2
1 , . . . , g
xq
1 , g
x
2 )
for a random x ∈ Z∗p as input, output (r, g
1
x+r
1 ) for an arbitrary r ∈ Zp \ {−x}.
In [6] the existence of ψ is not required.
Assumption 2 (Decisional Tripartite Diﬃe-Hellman (DTDH)). [22]
Every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A has a negligible success proba-
bility in telling apart the following two probability distributions D0 and D1, for
a pairing system psys:
D0 = (gx2 , g
y
2 , g
z
1 , g
u
2 ) for random x, y, z, u ∈ Z∗p
D1 = (gx2 , g
y
2 , g
z
1 , g
xyz
2 ) for random x, y, z ∈ Z∗p. In [22] it is also required
that ψ(g2) = g1 for technical reasons.
Boneh-Boyen’s (BB) signature scheme [5,6]. The secret and public keys
are sk = (y, s) and pk = (Y = gy2 , S = g
s
2), for random y, s ∈ Z∗p. The signature
on a message m ∈ Zp is σ = (r, g
1
y+m+rs
1 ), for a random r ∈ Zp. The signature σ =
(r, b) is veriﬁed by checking e(b, Y gm2 Sr) = gT . Boneh-Boyen’s signature scheme
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is (strong) existentially unforgeable under SDH (which is the asymptotic version
of q-SDH, where q is bounded by a polynomial on the security parameter [6]).3
3.2 A Concurrent Zero-Knowledge Argument
In this section we describe a concurrent zero-knowledge argument4, which is
an instance of the construction given by Damg˚ard in [11] applied to Chaum
and Pedersen’s Proof of Knowledge [9] of λ ∈ Zp∗ such that u1 = gλ1 and
u2 = gλ2 , on common input (g1, g2, u1, u2, p,G1, G2), where g1, u1 ∈ G1 \ {1} and
g2, u2 ∈ G2 \ {1} and G1 and G2 are groups of prime order p. The proof is used
in the design of the new partial signature scheme.
The well-known Chaum-Pedersen proof is a Σ-protocol that works as follows:
The prover picks a random γ ∈ Zp∗ and sends v1 = gγ1 and v2 = gγ2 to the veriﬁer.
Then the veriﬁer sends a challenge f ∈ Zp, and the prover responds by sending
s = γ + fλ to the veriﬁer. Finally, the veriﬁer checks the equations gs1 = v1u
f
1
and gs2 = v2u
f
2 . To make the protocol concurrent zero-knowledge, we make use
of Pedersen’s trapdoor commitments in [28]. To commit to a value m ∈ Zp,
we choose a random α ∈ Zp and compute the commitment C(α,m) = gαhm,
where g, h are two generators of a group G of prime order p. The trapdoor of
the commitment is t ∈ Zp such that h = gt. Obviously, the trapdoor allows to
open any commitment c for any m′ if we also know one opening C = C(α,m),
as C(α− t(m′ −m),m′) = C(α,m).
The concurrent version of the ZK proof works as follows: On common input
(g1, g2, u1, u2, p,G, g, h,G1, G2, H), where (g, h) is the auxiliary string and Hˆ :
G1×G2 → Zp is a collision resistant hash function, the prover computes γ, v1, v2
as in Chaum-Pedersen proof and sends a commitment C = C(α, Hˆ(v1, v2)) to
the veriﬁer. Then, the veriﬁer sends a challenge f , and the prover responds
sending (α, v1, v2, s) to the veriﬁer. Finally, the veriﬁer checks the validity of the
commitment and the veriﬁcation equations of Chaum-Pedersen proof.
Notice that the zero-knowledgeness of the proof can be proved without the
need of rewinding a dishonest veriﬁer. Indeed, the simulator, knowing the trap-
door of the commitments, just sends a commitment C = C(α,m) that he can
open in any possible way. Then, after receiving the challenge, the simulator
computes s, v1 = gs1u
−f
1 , v2 = g
s
2u
−f
2 and α
′ such that the commitment opens
correctly to m′ = Hˆ(v1, v2). Hence, the veriﬁer is allowed to choose the chal-
lenge in the whole set Zp, and only one round of the protocol suﬃces to achieve
soundness with a negligible probability 1/p.
Showing a knowledge extractor is not so trivial, but you can ﬁnd the details
in [10]. Basically, after rewinding an honest prover for a polynomial number
of times, one can get with high probability two conversations with the same
v1, v2 but two diﬀerent challenges f, f ′. Then, the extractor computes λ = (s′ −
3 The weaker (deterministic) signature σ = g
1
y+m
1 is also considered in the paper.
4 Actually, a ZK-argument is enough for the security of the proposed scheme, because
all parties are modeled as polynomial-time Turing machines.
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s)/(f ′ − f), where s, s′ are the responses given by the prover to the challenges
f, f ′, respectively.
4 The New DBB and PDBB Signature Schemes
Here we give a variation of the signature proposed by Boneh and Boyen, which is
still strongly unforgeable under the SDH assumption. For simplicity we refer to
it as DBB signature scheme (from Double Boneh-Boyen signature). Essentially,
the new signature consists of a weak-BB signature b on a random element r,
with respect to the base g1 and signing key x, and another BB signature c on
the message m with respect to the base bu and signing keys y and s.
– KeyGen. The signer chooses four random secret elements x, y, s, u ∈ Z∗p
and publishes pk = (X = gx2 , Y = g
y
2 , S = g
s
2, U = g
u
2 ).
– Sign. To sign a message m ∈ Zp, the signer chooses a random r ∈ Zp and
computes σ = (r, g
1
x+r
1 , g
u
(x+r)(y+m+rs)
1 ).
– Ver. To verify a signature σ = (r, b, c), a veriﬁer checks that e(b,Xgr2) = gT
and e(c, Y gm2 Sr) = e(b, U).
To improve the eﬃciency of the scheme, we can save computing some pairings
in the cost of a nonzero but negligible error probability: To verify a signature, a
veriﬁer can choose a random α < 2t and check a single equality e(b,Xgr2Uα) =
gT e(cα, Y gm2 S
r). Thus the computation of one pairing is replaced by two extra
short exponentiations, and the error probability in the veriﬁcation is 2−t.
Theorem 1. The DBB signature scheme is strong existentially unforgeable un-
der chosen message attack, assuming that the SDH Assumption holds.
Proof. Let F be a forger for the proposed scheme. We will use this forger to
make another forger A that after at most q adaptive queries to a BB signing
oracle, it outputs a valid BB message/signature pair, diﬀerent from the oracle
queries, with the same probability.
After receiving the public key of the BB signature instance (Y = gy2 , S = g
s
2),
A chooses random x, u ∈ Z∗p and lets X = gx2 , U = gu2 . Then A sends the DBB
public key pk = (X,Y, S, U) for the same pairing system to F . Every time that
F asks for a DBB signature on a message mi, A forwards the message to the
BB oracle and gets the BB signature (ri, γi) = (ri, g
1
y+mi+ris
1 ). Then A computes
and forwards (ri, g
1
x+ri
1 , γ
u
x+ri
i ) as a DBB signature on the message mi to F .
If F succeeds as a forger, then it eventually stops and outputs a valid forgery
(r∗, b∗ = g
1
x+r∗
1 , c
∗ = g
u
(x+r∗)(y+m∗+r∗s)
1 ) on the message m
∗ such that (m∗, r∗) is
diﬀerent from all (mi, ri). Raising c∗ to the power of x+r
∗
u , A will get g
1
y+m∗+r∗s
1
and outputs it as a valid BB forgery. Clearly, the success probability of F is not
less than the success probability of A. unionsq
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4.1 The Partial Signature Scheme (PDBB)
In order to get a partial signature scheme (which we call PDBB scheme), in which
signatures are not universally veriﬁable but can only be veriﬁed by the Trusted
Party or by the signer5, we build on the previous DBB scheme, introducing
the new public keys (Z1 = gz1 , Z2 = g
z
2) generated by the Trusted Party. The
signer can convince the recipient of the signature about its validity by means of
an interactive zero-knowledge proof. To make this proof non-convincing for an
external party, the signer uses a concurrent version of Chaum-Pedersen proof
of knowledge [9] combined with Pedersen’s trapdoor commitments [28], which
is an eﬃcient zero-knowledge argument in the auxiliary string model [11] (as
described in Section 3.2). We actually need that both the Trusted Party and the
recipient register their keys by proving in zero-knowledge (e.g., to a Certiﬁcation
Authority) the knowledge of the corresponding secret keys (respectively z and
the trapdoor of the commitment), so that the recipient cannot later deny his
ability to forge a validity proof.6 The proposed partial signature scheme consists
of the following protocols involving a signer A, a recipient B and the Trusted
Party:
– PKeyGen. As in DBB signatures, A chooses x, y, s, u ∈ Z∗p at random and
publishes pkA = (X = gx2 , Y = g
y
2 , S = g
s
2, U = g
u
2 ). The Trusted Party
chooses z ∈ Z∗p and registers (Z1 = gz1 , Z2 = gz2) proving the knowledge
of z. B chooses a random τ ∈ Z∗p and registers h = gτ also proving the
knowledge of τ , where G = 〈g〉 is a group of order p. The pair (g, h) is used
as the auxiliary string for the concurrent zero-knowledge argument in PVer.
Observe that no interaction between T and B is required.
– PSign. To sign a message m ∈ Zp, A chooses a random r ∈ Zp and computes
ρ = (r, Z
1
x+r
1 , g
u
(x+r)(y+m+rs)
1 ).
– PVer. Upon reception of a partial signature ρ = (r, d, c) from A, both A and
B engage in an interactive veriﬁcation protocol, ﬁrstly checking the equation
e(d,Xgr2) = e(g1, Z2), then running the concurrent zero-knowledge proof
that A knows λ = y+m+rs such that Y gm2 S
r = gλ2 and e(d, U) = e(c, Z2)
λ.
(See Section 3.2.)
– Conv. The Trusted Party extracts a DBB signature σ = (r, b, c) on m
from a PDBB signature ρ = (r, d, c), just by computing b = d1/z . Observe
that he can also verify the validity of ρ as e(d,Xgr2) = gzT and e(d, U) =
e(cz, Y gm2 S
r).
It can be shown that the above scheme is also strong existentially unforge-
able (even if z is given to the adversary) under the same assumption as DBB
signature. Moreover, an invisibility property holds. Namely, no polynomial-time
5 Observe that the partial signature scheme is not a fully-ﬂedged designated veriﬁer
scheme, since we do neither require the veriﬁer to prove the validity of a signature in a
non-transferable way, nor the signer to verify any previously issued partial signature.
6 As in most works we are only considering oﬀ-line non-transferability. For more details
on how to address on-line attacks see [23].
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adversary can distinguish a valid PDBB signature on an adversarially chosen
message m from a PDBB signature on a random message, under DTDH as-
sumption. Due to the lack of space we decided not to include the proofs in this
paper. However, these properties are implicitly used in the design of the contract
signing protocol presented in the next section, and the omitted security proofs
can be easily inferred from the security analysis of the contract signing protocol.
5 The Proposed Contract Signing Scheme
In this section we describe the proposed contract signing protocol following
the description of the three-move architecture instantiated with the signature
schemes presented in previous sections.
In order to prevent trivial attacks in the multi-user setting7, such as the one
reported in [13], the partial and ordinary signatures will be computed on the
contract digest m = H(M ||IDA||IDB||IDT ||t) instead of the contract itself,
where H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp is a collision-resistant hash function, IDA and IDB are
the identities of both signers, IDT is the identity of T , and t is the session dead-
line for Exch and Res. In this contract signing protocol, the ordinary signature
scheme is DBB, while the partial signature scheme is PDBB, both described in
the previous section.
We assume that all the parties are given the following system parameters: a se-
curity parameter  ∈ Z, the pairing system parameters psys = (p,G1, G2, GT , g1,
g2, e, ψ, gT ), where p is  bits long, the group G = 〈g〉 for the trapdoor com-
mitments, and the two collision resistant hash functions H, Hˆ : {0, 1}∗ → Zp,
respectively for the contract digest and the trapdoor commitments.
– Setup. Both signers A,B and T generate and certify their keys as speciﬁed
in PDBB PKeyGen8. So we deﬁne skA = (x, y, s, u, τ), pkA=(X,Y, S, U, h),
and similarly skB = (x′, y′, s′, u′, τ ′), pkB = (X ′, Y ′, S′, U ′, h′), and skT = z,
pkT = (Z1, Z2). We recall T proves the knowledge of z such that Z2 = gz2 ,
while A and B respectively prove the knowledge of τ and τ ′ such that h = gτ
and h′ = gτ
′
, to a certiﬁcation authority.
– Exch. Once A and B agree on M , the trusted party identity IDT and
a timeout t > Δ, both compute m and run the protocol as speciﬁed in
Section 2, using PSig, PVer, Sig and Ver in PDBB and DBB deﬁnitions.
Namely, in the ﬁrst move A runs PSig on M and sends ρA to B. Then A
and B execute PVer to check the validity of ρA. In case B do not accept, he
just leaves the protocol. In the second move, B runs Sig on M and sends σB
to A. In the third move, after A veriﬁes σB with Ver, she sends a signature
σA on M to B (computed with Sig or directly from ρA). After the second
move, if the time to the deadline t is less than Δ then B leaves Exch and
executes Res with T . On the other hand, if A has not received any message
from B or T at time t + Δ, then she exits the protocol.
7 However, we are not giving any security proof in the multi-user setting.
8 We assume both can potentially act as signers or veriﬁers, although A never uses τ
and h.
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– Res. B refers to T for resolving the partial signature ρA = (r, d, c) on M .
After identifying himself, he must send t, IDA, M together with ρA and his
partial signature ρB on m to T . T non-interactively checks the validity ρA
and ρB for m = H(M ||IDA||IDB||IDT ||t). If the protocol is not timed out
(with respect to the deadline t) and Res has not been invoked before for
the same m, then T runs Conv for both partial signatures and sends the
resulting b to B (i.e., σA = (r, b, c)) and σB to A. T temporarily stores the
tuple (m, IDA, IDB, t) until time t, to prevent further executions of Res on
the same contract.
5.1 Security Analysis
Correctness and ambiguity are straightforward from the description of the proto-
col. Moreover, setup-freeness is implied by the noninteractive nature of PKey-
Gen.
Security Against A. (Proof sketch.) If B accepts a partial signature ρ = (r, d, c)
on a message m, then e(d,Xgr2) = e(g1, Z2) and by the soundness of the zero-
knowledge argument, e(d, U) = e(c, Z2)y+m+rs so e(d, U) = e(cz, Y gm2 S
r). Thus
T will always accept ρ as valid and he can always compute b = d1/z, which
allows B to get the valid ordinary signature σ = (r, b, c). Notice that the only
way to break the soundness of the zero-knowledge argument is by using the
trapdoor information of the trapdoor commitment scheme. Indeed, an adversary
doing so can be used to get two diﬀerent openings of the same commitment (via
rewinding), and then compute the discrete logarithm of Z2 on base g2.
Security Against B. (Proof sketch.) As deﬁned before, we assume that B asks
only for executions of PSign, PVer and Res. Indeed, whenever B wishes to
know an ordinary signature on a message m, he simply needs to ask PSign to
obtain a partial signature, and then to ask Res on that signature. We consider
two diﬀerent adversaries F1 and F2 which use B as a subroutine: F1 breaks
the strong unforgeability of BB signature scheme, while F2 directly breaks the
SDH assumption. Basically F1 extracts a BB forgery from any partial signature
computed by B using a ‘fresh’ randomness r, while F2 breaks SDH by tying the
SDH instance description to one of the values of r used by the signing oracle
simulator, provided B uses exactly that value in the forgery. In either case, a
q-SDH instance is solved, since it is shown in [6] that any BB existential forger
can be used to break a q-SDH instance, with the same success probability.
Security against T. (Proof sketch.) We show that for any honest but curious T
we can build a DBB forger F which perfectly simulates T ’s (eavesdropping)
view of A and B in some contract signing protocol instances. Indeed, F starts
receiving the public key (X,Y, S, U) of a DBB instance, and completes it to
obtain A and B’s keys pkA = (X,Y, S, U, h = gτ ), skB = (x′, y′, s′, u′, τ ′) and
pkB = (X ′, Y ′, S′, U ′, h′). Then, F extracts z and (Z1, Z2) from T (by means of
the knowledge extractor for the proof of knowledge of the secret key, perhaps
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involving rewinding of T ) and sends him pkA and pkB . Now F can trivially
simulate everything for T except the partial signatures normally issued by A
and the transcripts of PVer. However, a partial signature on any message m
selected by F is computed by querying the DBB signing oracle to obtain σA, and
then converting it to ρA by means of z. The transcripts of PVer are simulated by
means of the trapdoor τ ′. Eventually, the malicious T outputs a forged signature
σ′A on a new message m
′, which is forwarded by F thus winning the unforgeability
game with the same probability as T (which in turn would imply that q-SDH
Assumption is false).9
Abuse-freeness. If the transcript of PSig+PVer is simulatable by B (without
interacting to A) then abuse-freeness is guaranteed. Observe that assuming that
nobody can issue valid partial signatures on behalf of A, simulatability of PSig
requires that valid and invalid partial signatures for a given message m cannot
be distinguished in probabilistic polynomial time. Moreover simulatability of
PSig+PVer also implies that a simulated validity proof for an invalid partial
signature must be indistinguishable from a real proof of validity of a valid partial
signature.
In our scheme the transcript of a successful execution PVer on a given (valid
or invalid) PDBB signature can be easily simulated due to the zero-knowledge
property of the concurrent Chaum-Pedersen proof (provided B knows his secret
key, which is guaranteed by the key registration process). Indeed, to compute the
simulated transcript ((C, f, α, v1, v2, δ) in the notation used in Section 3.2), B
ﬁrst chooses random challenge f and response δ of the Chaum-Pedersen proof,
then computes the witness (v1, v2) according to the veriﬁcation equations, and
ﬁnally computes the commitment C = gαh′Hˆ(v1,v2) for a randomness α. Observe
that no secret key is involved in those computations.
Therefore, simulatability of PSig+PVer depends only on the invisibility of
PDBB signatures, i.e., no polynomial time adversary can tell apart a valid PDBB
signature ρ = (r, d, c) on a message m from a valid signature ρ′ = (r, d, c′) on a
random (unknown) message m′, given m. We show that no external party D can
distinguish ρ from ρ′ given m. Actually, any such distinguisher D can be used
to build an adversary F which breaks the Decisional Tripartite Diﬃe-Hellman
Assumption (DTDH). A description of F follows:
After receiving the description (X0 = gx02 , Y0 = g
y0
2 , Z0 = g
z0
0 , U0 = g
u0
2 ) of an
instance of the DTDH problem for psys0 = (p,G1, G2, GT , g0, g2, e, ψ, gT0) such
that ψ(g2) = g0, F picks m and random α, s,  ∈ Z∗p and r ∈ Zp, and computes
psys = (p,G1, G2, GT , g1 = g0, g2, e, ψ, gT = g

T0), pkA = (X = X0g
−r
2 , Y =
Y0g
−m−rs
2 , S = g
s
2, U = U0) and pkT = (Z1 = ψ(X0)
α = gx0α1 , Z2 = X
α
0 ) and
9 Actually, we are proving a stronger version of the security against T . Indeed, an
honest but curious T cannot launch a chosen message attack, but he can only collect
some message/signature pairs. However, we could think on a Trusted Party who
inﬂuences the content of the contract signed by A. And this behavior must be seen
as a mild chosen message attack in which the adversary cannot choose the message
to be signed, but he can inﬂuence its probability distribution.
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sends psys, pkA, pkT them to D, along with m and ρ = (r, d = gα1 , c = Z

0).
Clearly d is a well-formed PDBB signature, since e(d,Xgr2) = e(g1, X0)
α =
e(g1, Z2). Moreover, ρ is valid for m if and only if e(d, U) = e(c, Z2)y+m+rs.
But e(d, U) = e(g1, U0)α = e(g1, gα2 )
u0 and e(c, Z2)y+m+rs = e(Z0, X
α
0 )
y0 =
e(g1, gα2 )
x0y0z0 . So ρ is valid for m if and only if u0 = x0y0z0. Then, F forwards
D’s output bit and, since the simulation of D’s environment is perfect, both D
and F have the same advantage.
6 Eﬃciency Considerations
In this section we compare our protocol’s performance compared to other existing
abuse-free protocols, based on on-line/oﬀ-line computations. Comparing to non
abuse-free protocols is nonsense, since achieving abuse-freeness is the most costly
task.
We have provided a table for comparison of eﬃciency between our scheme and
the abuse-free contract signing protocols [16,31], which are proven secure in the
random oracle model, and the standard-model one in [20]. The comparison is
based on the number of exponentiations and pairings computed by both signers
during the Exch protocol, and also the number of rounds and the amount of
data exchanged. The number of exponentiations given in [31] diﬀers from our
estimate because they have not considered the two exponentiations included in
each commitment computation. On the other hand the construction in [16] is
a generic construction based on the so-called OR-proofs and designated veriﬁer
signatures. We analyze an instantiation based on El-Gamal cryptosystem and
the designated veriﬁer proofs in [21], which use the signature by Chaum in [8].
The number of exponentiations computed by both the prover and veriﬁer in the
proof in [21] is 10, and they need almost the same number for the encryption.
An estimation of the overall computational cost of our Exch results in 6
exponentiations and 2 pairings to be computed on-line by A plus 6 oﬀ-line ex-
ponentiations. On the other hand, B has to compute 8 exponentiations and 4
pairings on-line, and 4 oﬀ-line exponentiations. The total communicated data in
our Exch is around 460 bytes (5 scalars, 6 points in G1, one in G2 and 1 pairing
result) for the usual sizes of pairing groups (160 bit ﬁnite ﬁeld and embedding
degree 6), while the RSA-based protocol in [31] uses about 1220 bytes to be
exchanged.
Taking into account that our protocol is secure in the standard model and that
the number of rounds is only 5, our protocol is comparablewithmost existing prac-
tical protocols.More precisely, our protocol has better round complexity and com-
munication complexity,while it is about 4 times slower.This shows that our scheme
is not only of theoretical interest but also it is suitable for practical applications.
As for the scheme in [20], although it achieves a similar security level in only 3
rounds and in the standard model, the use of Groth-Sahai non-interactive zero-
knowledge proofs increases the computational complexity beyond 162 pairing
computations10, and the parties have to exchange more than 82 group elements,
10 Only the NIZK proof is counted.
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Table 1. Eﬃciency comparison
Garay et al [16] Wang [31] Huang et al [20] Our Protocol
Computational cost 20 exp. 15 exp. > 162 pair. 24 exp. + 6 pair.
Bytes exchanged 1220 > 1600 460
Number of rounds 4 7 3 5
Security ROM ROM Std. Model Std. Model
or more than 1600 bytes11. Hence, from a practical point of view it cannot be
compared to our scheme.
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